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COURTS SHOULD APPLY A RELATIVELY MORE STRINGENT 
PLEADING THRESHOLD TO CLASS ACTIONS 
Matthew J.B. Lawrence∗ 
Policymakers from Senator Edward Kennedy to Civil Rules Advisory 
Committee Reporter Edward Cooper have proposed that class actions 
be subject to a more stringent pleading threshold than individually-filed 
suits, yet the question has not been fully explored in legal scholarship.  
This Article addresses that gap.  It shows that courts following the 
guidance of Bell Atlantic v. Twombly should apply a relatively more 
stringent pleading threshold to class actions, and a relatively less 
stringent threshold to individually-filed suits. 
 
This contribution is set forth in two steps.  First, this Article explains 
that, all else being equal, the anticipated systems’ costs and benefits of 
allowing a lawsuit brought via the class action mechanism past the 
pleading stage differ categorically from the costs and benefits of 
allowing through an individually-filed suit.  That is because a suit that 
comes to court via a class action circumvents a gate-keeping mechanism 
that is both prior to and more important than pleading: the potential 
litigant’s decision whether to sue.  Second, this Article points to the 
history of Twombly, the Supreme Court’s contemporaneous pleading 
decisions, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to show that courts 
should subject damages class actions to a relatively more stringent 
pleading threshold in light of the different mix of costs and benefits they 
pose. 
 
In addition to exploring in depth whether class actions should be subject 
to a different threshold, this Article briefly discusses two other areas 
where it may be appropriate to adjust the stringency of the pleading 
threshold based upon procedural context.  Specifically, it suggests that 
the stringency of the pleading threshold should depend upon whether a 
case is brought pro se and whether it seeks review of agency action on 
the administrative record. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1978, Senator Edward Kennedy introduced “A Bill to Revise Class 
Damage Procedures”1 which, among other things, would have imposed 
a special pleading requirement for class actions more stringent than the 
rule applicable to individually-filed suits.  The bill originated in the 
Department of Justice and was a response to the perceived revolution in 
civil litigation brought about by the creation of the opt-out damages 
class action reflected in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).  
Although it received significant scholarly attention,2 the bill was 
ultimately unsuccessful.  Still, the idea has never completely gone away; 
in 1998 Edward Cooper noted the possibility of “requiring more 
particularized pleading in class actions than in other litigation.”3 
In 1995, as part of incoming Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich’s 
“Contract with America,” Republicans in Congress introduced the 
“Private Securities Litigation Reform Act” (PSLRA).4  Among other 
things, the PSLRA required that federal private securities lawsuits plead 
mens rea with particularity.5  This change was in large part a response to 
the perceived abuse and waste caused by securities class actions brought 
pursuant to Federal Rule 23.6  The Act became law over President Bill 
Clinton’s veto, helped in part by the vote of Senator Edward Kennedy.7 
 
 1. S. 3475, 95th Cong., § 3006 (1978). 
 2. See Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the 
“Class Action Problem”, 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 682–93 (1978); see also George B. Mickum, III & 
Carol A. Rhees, Federal Class Action Reform: A Response to the Proposed Legislation, 69 KY. L.J. 799 
(1980); Dennis J. Block & Irwin H. Warren, New Battles in the “Class Struggle”—The Federal Courts 
Reexamine the Securities Class Action, 34 BUS. LAW. 455 (1978).  
 3. Edward H. Cooper, The (Cloudy) Future of Class Actions, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 923, 962 (1998). 
 4. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995). 
 5. Id. at 747 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2013)) (“[T]he complaint shall, with respect 
to each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong 
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”). 
 6. See generally S. REP. NO. 104-98 (1995); see also 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR 
R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1796.1 (3d ed. 2012) (cost of discovery in class 
actions was “the primary rationale” for provisions in the PSLRA mandating discovery be stayed pending 
resolution of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on the merits); Stephen J. Choi, Drew T. 
Johnson Skinner, & A.C. Pritchard, The Price of Pay to Play in Securities Class Actions, 8 J. Emp. L. 
Stud. 650, 651 (2011) (PSLRA was intended in large part to address perceived abuses in securities class 
actions); James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas, & Lynn Bai, Do Differences in Pleading Standards Cause 
Forum Shopping in Securities Class Actions?: Doctrinal and Empirical Analyses, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 
421, 431 (2009) (particularity pleading requirement in PSLRA was intended by Congress to curb what it 
perceived to be “the frequency of baseless securities class actions that were being filed to extort 
recoveries as a consequence of lax procedural protections of defendants”); Patrick E. Longan, Congress, 
the Courts, and the Long Range Plan, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 625, 645–46 (1997) (describing development 
of Private Securities Litigation Reform Act); Richard H. Walker & J. Gordon Seymour, Recent Judicial 
and Legislative Developments Affecting the Private Securities Fraud Class Action, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 
1003, 1023 (1998) (PSLRA was “designed to prevent abuses of federal securities class action lawsuits”). 
 7. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 78u-5 
3
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In 2007, the Supreme Court decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,8 
in which the Court held that a complaint seeking to bring a massive 
damages class action on behalf of millions of telephone service 
subscribers should be dismissed because it did not present a “plausible” 
claim for relief.9  The Court explained its decision preventing the suit 
(or, rather, millions of suits) from proceeding was necessary to combat 
the problem of “abuse” in civil litigation, though it did not elaborate at 
any length on that concept.  This lead to conjecture that the new 
“plausibility” requirement was limited to Twombly’s case type: an 
antitrust class action.10  But that conjecture was rejected in Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal,11 when the Court explained that the plausibility standard must be 
met by any Plaintiff hoping to bring a civil action in federal court.12  The 
two cases have sparked a wealth of debate in the federal reporters13 and 
law journals about the nature and stringency of the plausibility standard 
and the so-called “pleading problem”14 some believe the standard was 
intended to address. 
Considered together, these three moments in the history of pleading 
policy present an underlying question: Do cases brought via the class 
action mechanism warrant special treatment when it comes to pleading?  
In the host of post-Twombly pleading scholarship, the question has not 
yet been fully explored.15  This Article addresses that gap, and answers 
“yes,” class actions should get special treatment. 
Answering this question of pleading policy is no simple task.  In 
order to evaluate whether class actions should receive special treatment 
when it comes to pleading, we first need to at least sketch a conceptual 
framework that can explain what the pleading rule “should” be.  That 
framework must be complete enough to do two things: (1) evaluate 
 
(2006)); see also David H. Webber, Is ‘Pay-to-Play’ Driving Public Pension Fund Activism in 
Securities Class Actions? An Empirical Study, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2031, 2037 (2010) (discussing passage 
of PSLRA). 
 8. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 9. Id. at 556. 
 10. See William M. Janssen, Iqbal ‘Plausibility’ in Pharmaceutical and Medical Device 
Litigation, 71 LA. L. REV. 541, 555–56 (2011) (discussing confusion); see also Ettie Ward, The After-
Shocks of Twombly: Will We ‘Notice’ Pleading Changes?, 82 ST. JOHN’S. L. REV. 893 (2008) (same). 
 11. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 12. Id. at 684. 
 13. Kendall W. Hannon, Much Ado about Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811 (2008). 
 14. Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (2010). 
 15. Professor Moore rejects the possibility without explanation in his treatise.  5 JAMES WM. 
MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.61[1] (3d ed. 2012).  Professor Effron discusses and 
largely rejects the possibility in The Plaintiff Neutrality Principle: Pleading Complex Litigation in the 
Era of Twombly and Iqbal, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1997, 2029 (2010), but as explained below the 
analysis therein does not account fully for several considerations that undermine its conclusion.  See 
infra Part III(A)(2). 
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whether the expected benefits of allowing a particular case into court 
outweigh the expected costs in light of the case’s particular factual 
context; and (2) decide which aspects of a case (or “case facts”16) that 
alter these costs and benefits, if any, the pleading rule should take into 
account in a world in which information is both incomplete and costly. 
After laying out such a conceptual framework, this Article applies it 
in the class action context and concludes that, as a categorical matter, 
class actions warrant special treatment.  This is because the relative 
expected costs and benefits of allowing a suit brought via the class 
action past the pleading stage are different than the costs and benefits of 
allowing into court a lawsuit brought via a traditional, individual action.  
These differences are driven by a crucial categorical distinction between 
suits brought as class actions and those filed individually: ordinary 
lawsuits are subject to a gate-keeping device both antecedent to and 
more important than pleading—the individual litigant’s decision to 
sue—but the class action mechanism short circuits around this gate-
keeping device. 
Because the class action mechanism brings suits into court even when 
the individual litigants did not choose to sue, purported damages class 
actions pose a very different mix of costs and benefits at the pleading 
stage.  The expected costs of letting such a suit past the pleading stage, 
be they outcome-independent (like discovery expense) or outcome-
dependent (like the risk of false positives), exceed the expected costs of 
letting an individually-filed suit past the pleading stage.  As for the 
benefits, suits brought as class actions may (or may not) tend to do more 
to advance the outcome-dependent benefits of letting suits in, namely, 
advancing the goals of the underlying substantive law.  But suits brought 
to court through the class action mechanism do not do as much as 
individually-filed suits to further the sometimes forgotten transaction 
benefit of civil litigation, namely, the system’s interest in giving an 
interested litigant his day in court to air his grievance, right or wrong. 
The following is an example to illustrate the point: imagine two 
entities involved in fixing (actual) broken hearts, Acme, a medical 
supply company that manufactures pacemakers, and Dr. Bayer, a heart 
surgeon who puts them in.  Both injure, perhaps negligently, fifty 
customers/patients: Acme injures fifty of the 5,000 patients implanted 
with one of its pacemakers via a defect that it arguably should have 
noticed and fixed,17 and Dr. Bayer injures fifty patients in the years 
 
 16. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modeling Courts in THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 1 (Mark D. White ed., 2009) (modeling judicial decision making in “case space,” where 
cases are described by case facts). 
 17. This example has as its inspiration Cohen v. Guidant Corp., an actual would-be class action 
that was dismissed under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) on Feb. 15, 2011, in part for failure to plead a case 
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leading up to his retirement because the onset of old age has robbed him 
of his abilities but he refuses to recognize it.18 
Research on malpractice suit filing rates suggests that, of the 50 
patients injured during surgery performed by Dr. Bayer, perhaps six will 
ask a court to declare Dr. Bayer is at fault and order compensation; the 
rest will simply go on with their lives.19  When any patient does so, the 
court will apply the pleading standard of Rule 8 to determine whether to 
hear Patient v. Bayer and, if it does so and the patient succeeds, Dr. 
Bayer (or rather his insurer) will be on the hook for that one individual’s 
injury. 
The same percentage of Acme’s customers may go to court, but 
because Acme’s liability will be a question common to all class 
members (i.e. “should Acme have spotted the defect?”), its action will 
likely be susceptible to class treatment under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23.  There is a good chance that at least one of its injured 
customers will seek to bring the suit as a class action on behalf of all 50 
patients injured by the arguable defect in Acme pacemakers. 
If Patient v. Acme is allowed into court as a purported class action, 
Acme will face liability of a magnitude far greater than that faced by Dr. 
Bayer in the few individually-filed suits that may be brought against 
him.  Acme will face the prospect of a single suit in which it could be 
held liable for the damage done to close to 100% of the people injured 
by its pacemakers, most of whom would not (for whatever reason) have 
sued individually.  This fact makes the expected costs and benefits of 
allowing a class complaint against Acme past the pleading stage 
systematically different from the expected costs and benefits of allowing 
an individual suit against Dr. Bayer into court.  Among other changes, 
discovery costs will be relatively higher in the class action against 
Acme, because Acme will have a greater incentive to fight discovery 
and the burden of any search and production will be more readily 
 
“under the Rule 8(a) standards announced” in Twombly and Iqbal.  See Cohen v. Guidant Corp., No. 05-
08070-R, 2011 WL 637472, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2011). 
 18. This example has as its inspiration a news report about an 82-year-old vascular surgeon in 
California who was asked to surrender his medical license after a competency assessment ordered by the 
Medical Board of California determined that he “had visual-spatial abnormalities, could not do fine 
motor movements,” and “could not retain information.”  See Laurie Tarkan, As Doctors Age, Worries 
About Their Ability Grow, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2011, at D1 (“[E]xperts warn that there are too few 
safeguards to protect patients against those who should no longer be practicing.”).  The physician “did 
not think he had a problem.”  Id.; see also Jennifer F. Waljee et al., Surgeon Age and Operative 
Mortality in the United States, 244 ANN. SURG. 353 (2006) (concluding that for certain complex 
procedures, surgeons older than 60 years have statistically-significant higher mortality rates than their 
younger counterparts). 
 19. See PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, 
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 70 tbl.4.1 (1993) (about one in eight 
negligent injuries led to a legal claim); see also David M. Studdert et al., Negligent Care and 
Malpractice Claiming Behavior in Utah and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 250 (2000). 
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outweighed by the amount in controversy under the proportionality 
production rule of Federal Rule 26(b)(2).  The risk of a false positive 
will be greater because Acme may be risk averse and prefer to settle 
rather than face a huge all-or-nothing verdict.  Finally, if Acme really 
was at fault, the substantive law (here, tort) may benefit by allowing the 
class suit through because a successful class action will force Acme to 
compensate all of its victims rather than only those few who choose to 
sue and succeed in their suit, as Dr. Bayer would have to do.20  Because 
of this different mix of costs and benefits posed by class actions, the 
pleading standard applicable to such suits should be different.  If the 
added cost of discovery and false positives outweighs any added benefit 
associated with greater enforcement of the substantive law, the standard 
should be more stringent.  If the added cost is outweighed by any added 
benefit, then the standard should be less stringent. 
This Article makes two closely related contributions.  Its first 
contribution is to show that, for the reasons just discussed, the pleading 
threshold applicable to class actions should be different than that 
applicable to other suits, regardless whether that bar should be higher or 
lower in the class action context.  Reasonable people might disagree 
about the relative weights of the costs and benefits associated with class 
treatment and so may disagree about whether the rule for class actions 
should be more or less strict than the rule for individually-filed suits.  As 
a result, it is difficult to say more by means of logical syllogism than 
“the rule should be different.” 
Courts do not make pleading rules by logical syllogisms, however.  In 
our system, courts affect pleading policy by interpreting Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 8 and are bound to be faithful to precedent in doing so.  
This fact enables the second contribution of this Article—that courts 
should apply a more stringent pleading threshold to damages class 
actions than individually-filed suits. 
There is reason to believe that the Supreme Court’s latest effort at 
pleading reform is intended to address burdens on the litigation system 
that are caused disproportionately by class actions.  As a result, this 
Article shows that judges and justices interpreting and applying Rule 8 
pursuant to the Supreme Court’s instructions in Twombly should apply a 
relatively more stringent pleading threshold to class actions than 
individually-filed suits, all else being equal.  (Indeed, this author’s 
personal intuition is that the best way to address the burdens with which 
Twombly was most concerned while doing the least damage to an 
individual’s “day in court” may be to apply a strict pleading rule to 
 
 20. It would not be correct to say the substantive law “will” benefit because whether the 
substantive law is furthered by increasing the lawsuit rate depends on ones view of the purposes of the 
tort system.  See infra Part II(A)(2). 
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purported damages class action complaints and a notice pleading rule to 
most other complaints.) 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part II surveys recent pleading 
case law and literature in order to develop a taxonomy of the costs and 
benefits that should be considered in setting the stringency of the 
pleading threshold that a complaint must clear in order to make it into 
court, and also discusses what sort of case facts that influence these 
costs and benefits should be reflected in the pleading rule.  Part III then 
applies this methodology to damages class action complaints, and shows 
that the expected costs and benefits of allowing a case into court depend 
categorically upon whether the suit comes at the behest of a litigant who 
has decided to sue or via the class action mechanism, so that the 
pleading threshold applicable to damages class action complaints should 
be different than that applicable to individually-filed suits.  It then 
explains that courts interpreting and applying Rule 8 in a particular case 
(or, in other words, applying Twombly and Iqbal) should read the rule to 
require relatively more of class actions and relatively less of 
individually-filed suits.  Part IV discusses other potential situations 
beyond class actions where the framework developed in Part II suggests 
a more or less stringent pleading threshold is warranted, or at least 
should be considered.  Finally, a brief conclusion is offered. 
II. A FRAMEWORK FOR CALIBRATING THE STRINGENCY OF THE PLEADING 
THRESHOLD 
For decades most scholars and judges believed that anyone who 
wanted to bring a federal civil claim in federal court would be permitted 
to do so.21  So long as a would-be plaintiff came to court bearing a 
complaint that gave notice to the defendant of the plaintiff’s claim for 
relief and the grounds therefore—so that the defendant could prepare a 
defense—the courthouse doors would be open.   
In Twombly and then in Iqbal, the Supreme Court announced that the 
pleading standard is more difficult to meet than many believed.  Not just 
any federal case or controversy belongs in federal court, as Justice 
Souter and then Justice Kennedy explained.  Rather, only complaints 
that set forth a “plausible” claim to relief satisfy the pleading 
requirement of Federal Rule 8.22  The jury is still out on what the 
Justices meant by “plausible;” neither elaborated much, and they 
 
 21. See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 
163, 168 (1993); Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 
1749, 1750 (1998); Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 439 (1986). 
 22. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 
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themselves have publically disagreed on the meaning of the standard.23  
But the would-be plaintiffs in Twombly and Iqbal can themselves attest 
that the “plausibility” standard means at least that some who want to 
bring federal (or diverse) cases in federal court may not do so.  Pleading 
no longer serves only a notice-giving function, if it ever did—now it 
keeps some cases out of court altogether. 
Whatever the merits of the “plausibility” standard, one benefit of 
Twombly and Iqbal is that the two cases have provided the spark for a 
pleading renaissance.  Never before has so much judicial and scholarly 
attention been paid to the pleading process by which cases come into 
federal court.  No approach to the issue has been overlooked.  
Doctrinally, a significant and necessarily speculative effort (absent 
further judicial elaboration) is underway to understand exactly how the 
standard articulated in Twombly and Iqbal works.24  Empirically, a 
number of scholars have investigated how the “plausibility” standard is 
being interpreted by those who are best suited to understand the 
operation of the Federal Rules—federal judges.25 
Theoretically, and of most immediate importance to this Article, 
scholars have paid renewed attention to the role that access to court 
plays in federal civil litigation in an effort to better understand pleading 
policy and the tradeoffs at play in establishing a pleading standard.  If 
courts applying Rule 8 are to play Saint Peter and the courthouse doors 
are to be the pearly gates, then we need a theory of which lawsuits 
should be allowed through and which should be rejected. 
This Part builds upon existing literature to survey the costs and 
benefits relevant to the decision of whether a case should be allowed 
into court, and then addresses which case facts that influence these costs 
and benefits the pleading rule should take into account.  In other words, 
this Part lays out a framework that can be used in evaluating questions 
of pleading policy.  The framework here is articulated in terms of costs 
and benefits in order to enable a weighing for purposes of 
policymaking.26 
The framework described in this Part sets the stage for the analysis in 
 
 23. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 687 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 24. E.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2010); see David Noll, The Indeterminacy of Iqbal, 99 GEO. L.J. 
117 (2010). 
 25. E.g., Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal’s Measure: An Assessment of the Federal Judicial 
Center’s Study of Motions to Dismiss, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2011); Patricia Hatamyar, The Tao of 
Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553 (2010); Hannon, supra 
note 13, at 1811. 
 26. For an alternative but related framework articulated in terms of discrete goals rather than 
costs and benefits, see Martin H. Redish, Pleading, Discovery, and the Federal Rules: Exploring the 
Foundations of Modern Procedure, 6 FLA. L. REV. 845 (2012). 
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Part III of how the class action mechanism changes the pleading 
calculus, and the suggestion that, if Rule 8 must be read to include a 
gate-keeping pleading requirement as indicated in Twombly and Iqbal, 
that requirement should be relatively more stringent for suits brought as 
class actions and relatively less stringent for suits people actually decide 
to bring, all else being equal. 
A. The Costs and Benefits of Letting Suits into Court 
That setting the bar for cases to be allowed into court requires a 
“balance” has been widely recognized.27  It is equally well-known that 
the costs of discovery and risk of in terrorem settlements in speculative 
cases weigh in favor of a more stringent pleading standard that will keep 
more cases out of court.28  There is much less agreement, however, 
about the benefits that weigh in favor of letting lawsuits into court.  
These two sides of the “pleading equation,”29 are discussed below in 
turn. 
1. The Costs of Letting Suits In 
The costs of letting a suit into court can be subdivided into two 
categories: (1) outcome-independent costs, like money spent on 
discovery, and (2) outcome-dependent costs, like false positives that 
result when a defendant settles a speculative suit simply to avoid the 
unlikely risk of a losing judgment.  As for the former, in addition to 
discovery costs, outcome-independent costs most apparently include 
attorneys’ fees, the court’s time, and the cost to either party of releasing 
sensitive private information through litigation.  In economic terms, 
these can all be thought of as the transaction costs of civil litigation. 
Turning to outcome-dependent costs, these include the false positive 
discussed above, those costs imposed on innocent defendants who, for 
one reason or another, through settlement or a losing judgment, come to 
bear some liability.  (Liability borne by a guilty defendant may be seen 
as a cost to that defendant, but this Article lists it as a system benefit of 
letting suits in below.) 
The Supreme Court noted both sorts of costs in Twombly (though not 
in so many words).  Avoidance of discovery cost was a refrain 
throughout the court’s opinion.  And regarding false positives, the Court 
quoted with approval the statement in Dura Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. 
Broudo that a complaint must support more than the mere possibility of 
 
 27. E.g., Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 111 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 28. Id. 
 29. See generally Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90 (2009). 
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liability “lest a plaintiff ‘with a largely groundless claim be allowed to 
take up the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so 
representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement value.’”30 
2. The Benefits of Letting Suits In 
Much less attention has been paid to the other side of the pleading 
equation—the benefits of letting lawsuits into court.31  The Supreme 
Court in Twombly and Iqbal offered no guidance; it did not even hint at 
what countervailing considerations make lawsuits worthwhile, instead 
taking what Arthur Miller has called a “telescopic focus on the burdens” 
of litigation.32  But it is impossible to talk of the appropriate pleading 
standard without identifying the benefits of letting lawsuits into court in 
addition to the costs.33 
The most readily apparent benefit of letting lawsuits into court, and 
the most prominent in the literature, is that the imposition of liability on 
a guilty defendant advances the substantive law that forms the basis for 
the cause of action.34  A damages award against a party that has in fact 
violated a law (in theory) deters further violations of that law, often 
compensates the person who suffered a legal injury, and can serve the 
purpose of retribution. 
Some scholars that have modeled pleading and the goals of civil 
procedure assume, without saying so, that this outcome-dependent 
benefit, enforcement of substantive law, is the only benefit to 
litigation.35  For example, in his analysis of Twombly Professor Epstein 
concluded that “standard expected utility calculations suggest that 
litigation should be allowed to go forward only when the likelihood of a 
positive case is high enough to justify . . . the enormous costs of 
 
 30. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557–58 (2007) (citing Dura Pharm. Inc. v. 
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347(2005)). 
 31. Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L. J. 1, 66 (2010) (“Unfortunately, the empirical work done so far on the 
expense of litigation, including the submissions to the Duke Conference, only explores one side of the 
cost–benefit equation.”). 
 32. Id. at 71. 
 33. Id. (“Given the current state of procedural flux and its direction, a wide-angle evaluation of 
the pretrial process must replace today’s telescopic focus on the burdens on defendants.  That seems a 
necessary precursor for developing balanced and workable solutions.”); Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. 
Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L. J. 765, 768 (2010) 
(“Without a normative standard, it is impossible to say, in any meaningful way, that litigation is too 
expensive.”). 
 34. E.g., Bone, supra note 24, at 849. 
 35. Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) 
Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61 (2007). 
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discovery in class action antitrust suits.”36  Professor Epstein did not 
explain from whence he had derived the implicit view of the utility 
function of the civil justice system that underlies this statement.  On this 
view, it should be noted, there is never any value in allowing a meritless 
suit (one brought against a party who has not in fact violated the law) 
into court. 
However, courts, politicians, and other scholars have identified a 
second sort of benefit of litigation that is outcome-independent.  
Namely, in the eyes of many, giving a person who has been injured his 
day in court is itself a system value, even if the court winds up deciding 
(correctly) that the target of his lawsuit bears no fault.  As Benjamin 
Spencer has explained, “[a]ccess to justice is a cornerstone principle of 
our democracy.  Vital to that principle is our civil justice system and the 
ease with which those who have been aggrieved are able to seek relief 
from the federal courts.”37  As shorthand, this Article refers to this as the 
access value.38 
This access value is furthered regardless of whether a lawsuit, once 
brought, leads to a judgment against a guilty party.39  The system 
benefits even when a losing suit is brought and loses, because the “sharp 
clash of proofs presented by adversaries in a highly structured forensic 
setting” is fundamental to resolving a dispute in a way that is acceptable 
not only to the winner, but to the loser.40 
In economic terms, while civil litigation certainly has outcome-
independent transaction costs, it has outcome-independent transaction 
benefits, too.  In terms of our recurring example, some would say the 
system benefits when a patient who feels he (or a loved one) was 
wronged by Acme (or Dr. Bayer) gets the opportunity to have his 
grievance considered by a neutral judge, even if the court ultimately 
concludes that Acme (or Dr. Bayer) did nothing wrong.41 
Professor Arthur Miller has been a passionate and tireless advocate of 
 
 36. Id. at 81. 
 37. A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L REV. 1, 2 (2009). 
 38. It might also be called the rule of law value. 
 39. Cf. Spencer, supra note 37, at 23 (“The second and equally important sense of the term 
justice refers to the value of procedural fairness, meaning that the procedure established to resolve a 
dispute permits the aggrieved and the accused to participate in the proceedings and have their claims and 
defenses heard and resolved in a fair manner.  Processes that promote litigant access, permit the 
discovery of supporting evidence, and call for resolution by an impartial decisionmaker can be viewed 
as procedurally just regardless of the accuracy of the result.”). 
 40. STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO 
ADJUDICATION 2 (1988). 
 41. Cf. Joan Savitsky, MD., A Patient Dies, and Then the Anguish of Litigation, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 29, 2009, at D 5 (describing children of a deceased patient, “whom I barely knew, were coping 
with their own complex emotions, which I imagined to be grief, very likely anger and frustration, and 
perhaps misunderstanding.  Filing a malpractice suit somehow addressed this”). 
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the access value.  In his Article lamenting what he perceives to be the 
access value’s declining salience among those who set the rules of 
procedure, he asked, “after Twombly and Iqbal, is our American court 
system still one in which an aggrieved person, however unsophisticated 
and under-resourced he may be, can secure a meaningful day in 
court?”42  In his view, Twombly and Iqbal overlooked the access value, 
subordinating it “to one-dimensional claims of excessive litigation costs 
and abuse that have not been validated.”43  As one Court put it, our 
“system [is] becoming increasingly inaccessible to the average 
citizen.”44  By so doing, in Professor Miller’s view, policymakers have 
“overlooked . . . that the modes of civil procedure are the mechanisms 
for operating an important societal regulatory system.”45 
Professor Miller is not alone; after Iqbal, a House Subcommittee held 
a hearing titled “Access to Justice Denied,” considering the 
ramifications of Twombly and Iqbal and possible legislative responses to 
the cases.46  As Benjamin Spencer notes,47 courts have recognized the 
right of court access as a fundamental value of civil litigation: “The right 
to sue and defend in the courts is the alternative of force.  In an 
organized society it is the right conservative of all other rights, and lies 
at the foundation of orderly government.  It is one of the highest and 
most essential privileges of citizenship.”48  The value was recognized as 
early as Marbury: “The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in 
the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, 
whenever he receives injury.”49  Indeed, a limited right of court access is 
constitutionality-mandated by the First Amendment.50 
Of course, unlike discovery cost, the value of court access is hard—
perhaps impossible—to quantify.51  More could certainly be said about 
 
 42. Miller, supra note 31, at 2; see also Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the 
“Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury 
Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 987–88 (2003) (expressing concern for erosion of access 
to courts). 
 43. Miller, supra note 31, at 2. 
 44. Scheetz ex rel. Scheetz v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 152 F.R.D. 628, 630 n.2 (D. Mont. 
1993) (quoting Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Equal, Accessible, Affordable Justice Under Law: The Civil Justice 
Reform Act of 1990, 1 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3 (1992)). 
 45. Miller, supra note 31, at 71–72. 
 46. Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 47. Spencer, supra note 37, at 27 n.124. 
 48. Id. (citing Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907)). 
 49. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). 
 50. Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983) (“[T]he right of access to the 
courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of grievances.”). 
 51. See Spencer, supra note 37, at 24 (“Neither can we know with any certainty the degree to 
which premature dismissals of invalid claims undermine the public’s sense of the system’s procedural 
fairness and how that may impact its perceived legitimacy.”). 
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the access value, not to mention the other costs and benefits of lawsuits.  
But a fuller exposition is not necessary for, and therefore beyond the 
scope of, this Article. 
B. Which Case Facts Should Affect the Stringency of the Pleading 
Threshold? 
In a world of perfect and costless information, the optimal pleading 
rule would simply take into account all case facts that affect the costs 
and benefits of letting a suit into court.  But we do not live in such a 
world, and so the question of which case facts the pleading rule should 
take into account is more complicated.  Courts have limited information 
about the cases in front of them, especially at the pleading stage.  As a 
result, identification of the facts about a case and determination of their 
influence on the system costs and benefits of letting the suit into court 
can be a costly endeavor in itself, and the cost of this endeavor might 
well outweigh the benefits of a finely-tailored rule. 
In order to identify exactly which case facts should be taken into 
account and when, one would need detailed empirical data, or, absent 
that, years of experience with various case types, such that it would be 
possible to estimate the likely cost of identifying whether a particular 
case fact is present in a case and compare that estimated cost to the 
estimated benefit of screening more (or less) strictly cases that include 
that fact.  As this author has neither the data nor the experience to 
evaluate precisely which case facts the pleading rule ought to take into 
account, doing so is a task beyond the scope of this Article. 
It is possible to say without such detailed data, however, that the 
pleading rule should take into account case facts that (1) are present on 
the face of the complaint, and (2) categorically affect the expected 
system costs and benefits of letting the case into court.  Such facts can 
be identified without costly fact-finding or dispute between the parties. 
Under Twombly and Iqbal, the court already takes into account one 
such case fact that is present on the face of the complaint and affects the 
system costs and benefits of the case.  Specifically, the court considers 
whether the facts alleged in the complaint rise to the level of 
“plausibility.”  The preceding framework certainly suggests this aspect 
of a case should be considered in deciding whether the case should be 
allowed into court (assuming that pleading must serve some screening 
function, as it now must under Twombly and Iqbal).  The allegations of a 
complaint are of course present on its face.  As for the categorical 
system costs and benefits of letting a case into court, to the extent that 
“plausibility” correlates with likelihood of success, it certainly affects 
system costs and benefits.  Both the estimated outcome-dependent costs 
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(like false positives) and the estimated outcome-dependent benefits (like 
advancement of substantive law) of letting a case into court depend on 
an obvious way upon the estimated likelihood that the case will be a 
winner. 
As discussed in the next Part, the costs and benefits of letting a case 
into court also depend to a significant degree upon the mechanism by 
which a suit comes to court.  Specifically, damages suits that come as 
class actions and individually-filed suits pose a very different mix of 
expected benefits and burdens.  As a result, the pleading standard for 
these two types of cases should be different. 
III. PLEADING CLASS ACTIONS 
After a brief background of the rule that governs damages class 
actions, Federal Rule 23(b)(3), Part A below explores how class 
treatment under the rule categorically alters the costs and benefits of 
allowing a suit into court.  Part B then makes a recommendation based 
upon that analysis: the pleading rule applicable to class actions should 
be different, and for purposes of courts faithfully applying the teachings 
of Twombly in interpreting Federal Rule 8, it should be more stringent. 
In the federal system, the courts themselves have broad authority to 
issue rules that govern their own internal procedures.  Via the Rules 
Enabling Act (REA), Congress delegated to the federal courts power to 
issue rules that do not “abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive 
right.”52  Under the authority granted by the REA, the courts have 
adopted a variety of rules codified in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure governing the process by which lawsuits are brought, 
including a general rule governing pleading, Federal Rule 8.53 
One of the most controversial rules adopted by the federal courts 
through their Rules Enabling Act power is Rule 23, the rule providing 
for class actions.  Under this rule, a judge can allow a plaintiff to sue not 
just on behalf of himself, but also on behalf of all similarly-situated 
persons who arguably were harmed in the same way by the same 
defendant.  Through this mechanism, a person’s lawsuit can be brought 
in federal court and he can win or lose, all without ever being aware that 
he had a case. 
In order for a suit seeking money damages to proceed in this manner 
under Rule 23(b)(3), the judge must find that the various cases that 
would be brought via the class action are sufficiently similar to be 
susceptible to class treatment and that the lead plaintiff—who wants to 
 
 52. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1990). 
 53. FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 
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bring other potential plaintiffs’ suits for them—is fit to serve that role.  
This is done using a five-part test, pursuant to which the judge must 
conclude: (1) the class is so numerous as to make joinder of all members 
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class 
that predominate over any individual questions, (3) the claims of the 
lead plaintiff or plaintiffs are typical of the claims of absent class 
members, (4) class treatment would be superior to other available 
methods for fair and efficient adjudication, and (5) the lead plaintiff or 
plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the absent 
class members. 
As the Rules Advisory Committee has stated and the Supreme Court 
echoed (or trumpeted), the rule facilitates the vindication of the “rights 
of groups of people who individually would be without effective 
strength to bring their opponents to court at all” because their claims 
would lead to recoveries too small to be individually profitable.54  As 
stated, “[a] class action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively 
paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an 
attorney’s) labor.”55  This is because, while each plaintiff whose lawsuit 
is brought as a class action receives only their share of any judgment, 
the single lawyer who litigated all their suits receives a proportionate 
chunk of the aggregated judgment. 
Neither the Rules Advisory Committee nor commentators expected 
the dramatic changes that the new class action rule would work on mass 
tort, securities, and other types of litigation, especially in positive-value 
cases (cases in which the potential benefit of suit already outweighs the 
cost).  Indeed, the Advisory Committee stated, in issuing the rule, that a 
“‘mass accident’” resulting in injuries to numerous persons is 
“‘ordinarily not appropriate’ for class treatment . . . .”56  The rule lay 
relatively dormant in the field of high-value claims until the Dalkon 
Shield case, when it first began being used for mass torts and products 
liability actions.  Once the rule’s power had been demonstrated, 
however, use of the device became ever more “adventuresome.”57  Ever 
since, it has been looked upon as civil litigation’s Frankenstein monster 
or shining knight, depending upon who you talk to.58 
 
 54. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Benjamin Kaplan, A 
Prepatory Note, 10 B.C.L. REV. 497 (1969)). 
 55. Id. (citing Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp. 109 F.3d. 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
 56. Id. at 625. 
 57. Id. at 617. 
 58. See Miller, supra note 2, at 682–93. 
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A. Federal Rule 23 and the Costs and Benefits of Letting a Suit into 
Court 
The class action device has been at the center of numerous efforts at 
pleading reform,59 successful and not, including Twombly itself.  It is 
surprising, therefore, that the implications of the class action device for 
pleading have received scant attention in the torrent of recent pleading 
scholarship.  This Part addresses that void by applying the framework 
developed in the last Part to evaluate whether and how the fact that a 
suit comes to court via a class action categorically alters the four types 
of pleading policy costs and benefits discussed in Part III: outcome-
dependent costs, outcome-independent costs, outcome-dependent 
benefits, and outcome-independent benefits.  But before doing so, it is 
necessary to discuss a categorical effect of class treatment that will 
inform every step of this analysis.  Class certification circumvents an 
important gate-keeping mechanism that has historically kept cases out of 
court even before the pleading stage: the decision to sue. 
1. A Categorical Effect of Class Treatment 
Although pleading is the most visible mechanism for determining 
which cases come through the courthouse door, and understandably has 
been the primary focus of recent court access scholarship, it is usually 
not the most important.  Rather, the individual litigant’s decision 
whether to sue is a far more important determinant of whether a lawsuit 
is brought for most potential cases.  As discussed below, available 
empirical research available suggests that litigant self-selection screens 
out (prevents from being brought) from 50–90% of potential lawsuits. 
Contrary to economic theorizing on the subject,60 people do not just 
decline to sue only in cases where it would be unprofitable to litigate; we 
routinely decline to bring even potentially profitable lawsuits.61  Indeed, 
 
 59. E.g., A Bill to Revise Class Damage Procedures, S. 3475, 95th Cong. § 3006 (1978); Cooper, 
supra note 3, at 962. 
 60. E.g., Bradford Cornell, The Incentive to Sue: An Option-Pricing Approach, 19 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 173 (1990); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 
437 (1988). 
 61. Some studies of when people decide to sue have found support for the “fault and equity 
approach.”  This theory explains lawsuits as arising when people believe “that someone else is at fault 
and a successful claim for compensation can restore the justice or equity of the situation.” Faten Sabry 
& Frederick C. Dunbar, The Propensity to Sue: Why Do People Seek Legal Action, 42 BUS. ECON. 31 
(2007); Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis—Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L. J. 443, 448 (1987) 
(citing studies).  For example, in one survey, those who blamed others for an accident (rather than 
themselves) were more than ten times more likely to consider suing.  Herbert M. Kritzer, Propensity to 
Sue in England and the United States of America: Blaming and Claiming in Tort Cases, 18 J. L.  SOC’Y 
400 (1991). 
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numerous qualitative studies of actual litigant behavior have shown that 
we do not decide to sue based on purely economic motives, whatever 
highly-publicized examples of American “litigiousness” might 
suggest.62  Ellickson, in a study of lawsuit behavior in a rural farming 
community, provides several anecdotes: 
The landowners who were interviewed clearly regard their restraint in 
seeking monetary relief as a mark of virtue.  When asked why they did 
not pursue meritorious legal claims arising from trespass or fence-finance 
disputes, various landowners replied: “I’m not that kind of guy;” “I don’t 
believe in it;” “I don’t like to create a stink;” “I try to get along.”‘ The 
landowners who attempted to provide a rationale for this forbearance all 
implied the same one, a long-term reciprocity of advantage.  Ann 
Kershaw: “The only one that makes money [when you litigate] is the 
lawyer.”‘ Al Levy: “I figure it will balance out in the long run.” Pete 
Schultz: “I hope they’ll do the same for me.”‘ Phil Ritchie: “My family 
believes in ‘live and let live.’”63 
Ellickson’s study is not unique.64  One study showed social pressure 
against suing in a rural Illinois community, regardless of the identity of 
the tortfeasor.65  Another study showed a largely Baptist opposition to 
lawsuits in an Atlanta suburb.66  Yet another study, relevant to Patient v. 
Bayer, showed that patients sue their doctors for potential malpractice 
only a fraction of the time.67  This fraction appears to go down when the 
doctor offers an apology.68  And in a very different context, Cox & 
Thomas found that institutional investors with extremely high stakes 
claims (averaging $90,000) file to collect on class settlements with 
 
 62. Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability 
Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 984, 988 (2003) (prominent litigation examples like suit against McDonalds for serving coffee too 
hot are covered in the media but are not reported accurately and unrepresentative of civil litigation 
generally). 
 63. Robert Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta 
County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 681–82 (1986). 
 64. For a similar qualitative approach to understanding lawsuit behavior, see, e.g., As Seen on 
TV: The Normative Influence of Syndi-Court on Contemporary Litigiousness, 11 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. 
L. J. 1 (2004).  See also WEILER ET AL., supra note 19, at 70 tbl.4.1 (about one in eight negligent injuries 
led to a legal claim); Abel, supra note 61. 
 65. David M. Engel, The Oven Bird’s Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal Injuries in an 
American Community, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 551 (1984). 
 66. M. P. Baumgartner, Social Control in Suburbia, in 2 TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF 
SOCIAL CONTROL 79, 82, 93 (Donald Black ed., 1984). 
 67. WEILER ET AL., supra note 19, at 140 (reporting that “our analysis of malpractice litigation 
data demonstrates that the problem is not a litigation surplus, but a litigation deficit”). 
 68. Kevin Sack, Doctors Start to Say ‘I’m Sorry’ Before ‘I’ll See You in Court’, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 18, 2008, at A.1. 
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securities violators less than 30% of the time.69  These studies do not 
reveal why it is we so rarely sue.  In behavioral terms, three possibilities 
are: that we have internalized an obligational norm against litigation70 
(such as the one shared by some Lutheran denominations that was the 
impetus for the Supreme Court’s recent decision on the ministerial 
exception to Title VII),71 that we do not want to appear litigious,72 or 
that our decision to sue is affected by some form of status quo bias.73 
Whatever the reason for litigant self-selection, what matters for 
present purposes is that it plays a much reduced role in that subset of 
cases where suit can be brought by class action.  Theoretically, because 
suing is a passive rather than an active decision under the class action 
procedure,74 the behavioral considerations that might normally motivate 
self-selection—be they normative, reputational, or fueled by status quo 
bias—are circumvented by the class mechanism.  Normative and 
reputational considerations can be reduced when an act is passive rather 
 
 69. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip through Your Fingers: Empirical 
Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in Securities 
Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 428 (2004).  The authors of the study explain this 
surprisingly low rate as the result of a desire on the part of those who head investment institutions not to 
be seen as joining the plaintiff’s lawyers in suing a common enemy.  After all, those who work at public 
investment institutions often later seek work in the private sector working for the very same companies 
that are usually defendants in large securities cases.  Noting that no institutional investor has ever agreed 
to be a lead plaintiff in a securities class action, Cox & Thomas explain that: 
The same social and commercial forces that prevents banks, mutual funds, and insurance 
companies from stepping forward to be a lead plaintiff may also weaken the commitment 
of their managers to assure the firm reaps the full advantage of securities class action 
litigation. 
Id. at 428. 
 70. An “obligational norm” is a “rule[] or practice[] that actors not only self-consciously adhere 
to or engage in, but feel obliged in some sense to adhere to or engage in, although (by hypothesis) the 
rule or practice is neither a legal nor an organizational rule.” In such a case “a departure from the norm 
is likely to involve either self-criticism or criticism by others.”  Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law 
and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1257 (1999). 
 71. See Hosanna Tabor Evangelical Church and School v. EEOC, 132 S.Ct. 694 (2012). 
 72. For a discussion of the desire of some patients not to signal litigiousness to their doctors in 
Matthew J.B. Lawrence, In Search of an Enforceable Medical Malpractice Exculpatory Agreement: 
Introducing Confidential Contracts as a Solution to the Doctor-Patient Relationship Problem, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 850, 870–73 (2009). 
 73. The tendency of people to favor the “status quo” in making decisions is well established, but 
the mechanism behind this tendency, and the mechanism by which people come to perceive a state of 
affairs to be the “status quo,” is not so well established.  See A. Nicolle et al., A regret-induced status-
quo bias, 31 J. Neurosci. 3320 (2011) (discussing possible explanations for status quo bias, positing and 
evaluating one hypothesis).  
 74. Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the 
Foundations of Due Process, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1615 (2003).  Redish and Larsen argue that opt-out 
class treatment violates the stakeholder’s due process right—a stakeholder who simply does not opt out 
of a class could lose her stake as a result of the passive decision (or lack thereof) not to opt out.  They do 
not reach the pleading issues discussed in this Article. 
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than active,75 and status quo bias may encourage rather than discourage 
litigation when the class action device is utilized—because a plaintiff 
must affirmatively opt-out in order to prevent his suit from being 
brought.76  If this reasoning holds, we would expect the lawsuit rate to 
increase dramatically when suit is brought via the class action 
mechanism. 
This theoretical projection is consistent with studies of actual litigant 
behavior, which show across the board that the rate at which individuals 
participate in an opt-out class action is nearly 100%.77  While only a 
fraction of injured patients would sue in Patient v. Bayer, all injured 
patients save a few who opt-out would be part of the class action in 
Patient v. Acme. 
2. Federal Rule 23 and the Costs and Benefits of Pleading 
Does the categorical effect of class treatment on lawsuit rates alter the 
costs and benefits of allowing a suit into court?  Yes, as discussed 
below. 
a. Outcome-independent Costs 
At least according to popular perception, the primary driver of 
outcome-independent costs in litigation is discovery cost.  The 
relationship between the discovery cost aspect of the pleading equation 
and the class mechanism has been subject to scholarly attention.  In The 
Plaintiff Neutrality Principle, in addition to analyzing plausibility 
pleading as applied to allegations regarding Plaintiff (and potential 
Plaintiff) conduct, Professor Effron argues that class actions should not 
 
 75. See Lawrence, In Search of an Enforceable Medical Malpractice Exculpatory Agreement, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. at 870–71. 
 76. The possibility that status quo bias could be at play in the decision to sue and affected by 
class certification has been pointed out elsewhere by Professors Issacharoff and Geoffrey Miller, though 
not in so many words.  Speaking of the choice between an opt-in and an opt-out procedure they said:  
In the case of opt-outs, the path of inertia—doing nothing—also is the path of rationality.  
It is nearly always in the class member’s interest not to opt-out of class cases. If the class 
member opts out he gains virtually nothing but loses the right to participate in whatever 
benefit the class litigation may generate—a small benefit, perhaps, but still one that 
confers some value.  Conversely, if the class member does nothing, he loses nothing 
other than an essentially worthless right to bring his own lawsuit, but gains the right to 
participate in the proceeds of the class litigation.  A rational class member will not opt-
out. 
Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?, 62 VAND. L. 
REV. 179 (2009). 
 77. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action 
Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1549 (2004) (reporting trivial 
opt-out rate). 
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be subject to greater scrutiny in evaluating plausibility, because class 
treatment does not increase discovery cost.78  Professor Effron’s analysis 
is not complete, because it does not adequately incorporate three 
litigation considerations that, by virtue of the categorical effect of class 
treatment discussed above, do cause class treatment to increase 
discovery cost.  In light of these considerations, while discovery cost 
necessarily varies a great deal from case to case, we should theoretically 
expect discovery to be categorically more costly in class actions than it 
is in individually-filed suits, all else being equal. 
First, Professor Effron suggests that class actions can reduce 
discovery costs because, when multiple actions are consolidated in a 
single class action, redundant discovery for each suit need not be 
duplicated.  Even assuming the premise is true—that those who opt out 
of class actions do not seek their own independent and costly discovery, 
undermining the efficiency benefits of class treatment—as Professor 
Effron recognizes, coordinated discovery is not just possible without 
class treatment, but routine.  Even where class treatment is unavailable, 
individually-filed lawsuits that share “one or more common questions of 
fact” (a more easily met test than Rule 23’s requirement that common 
questions “predominate”) can be consolidated in a single court for 
coordinated discovery by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 
regardless where they are filed.79  Using this process, a judge “need not 
rely on the class action, with its demanding requirements, to achieve the 
benefits of aggregation.”80  Therefore, there is no reason to believe that 
class actions create a significant efficiency benefit as compared to other 
formal (or informal) means of coordinating discovery. 
Second, Professor Effron’s analysis does not address the fact that, as 
discussed above, the class action significantly increases the stakes of a 
lawsuit by increasing the number of suits at issue in an action.  This has 
direct implications for discovery because the rules that govern discovery 
include a proportionality requirement: when a defendant opposes 
discovery because it would be “burdensome,” the court inquires whether 
the requested discovery is likely to be worth the expense pursuant to 
Federal Rule 26(b)(2).  Specifically, the court asks whether “the burden 
of expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, 
considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ 
 
 78. Robin J. Effron, The Plaintiff Neutrality Principle: Pleading Complex Litigation in the era of 
Twombly and Iqbal, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1997, 2028–40 (2010). 
 79. See generally Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model for Resolving Complex Litigation if a 
Class Action Is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2205 (2008). 
 80. Id.; see also Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of 
Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, NYU School of Law, Law & Econ. 
Research Paper No. 09-09; Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation? Toward a 
Maximalist Use of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2245 (2008). 
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resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the 
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.”81 
So it is that as the stakes goes up, the extent to which additional 
discovery is warranted goes up as well.  The more Acme stands to lose 
in a lawsuit, the more a court should require Acme to do in order 
produce potentially relevant evidence to the patient, according to 
Federal Rule 26(b)(2). 
Finally, and relatedly, Professor Effron’s analysis does not address 
the fact that a defendant’s incentive to litigate discovery—rather than 
just turn over any requested documents—depends in large part upon the 
magnitude of the defendant’s exposure should discovery turn up a 
smoking gun.  “[D]iscovery is not just about uncovering the truth, but 
also about how much of the truth the parties can afford to disinter.”82  
Institutional defendants—or, more specifically, their in-house and hired 
counsel—often do not know what discovery will uncover unless and 
until they take the time to review the documents they have agreed to 
produce.  Hence the term “fishing expedition.”83  As a result, 
“[c]ompanies are willing to invest more in cases where the stakes 
are . . . high.”84  Again, because class treatment increases the stakes of 
litigation, it increases the incentive to litigate discovery and, therefore, 
expected discovery costs, all else being equal. 
b. Outcome-dependent Costs 
As for outcome-dependent costs, Federal Rule 23 increases the risk of 
false positives associated with allowing a suit to proceed past the 
pleading stage by increasing the likelihood that a defendant who has not 
violated the law will be forced into a settlement in order to avoid even a 
very small risk of a massive judgment.  This threat has been recognized 
almost since the rule’s inception.  Harry Friendly first described the 
phenomenon in 1972, famously calling many class settlements 
“blackmail settlements.”  Richard Nagareda explored this concern and 
disaggregated two reasons innocent defendants are more likely to settle 
lawsuits brought as class actions than individually-filed suits: the 
“addition effect” (the fact that class treatment increases the total number 
of claims brought against the defendant) and the “amplification effect” 
(the possibility that by clumping all suits into one all-or-nothing lawsuit, 
 
 81. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2). 
 82. Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 83. E.g., N. River Ins. Co. v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 872 F. Supp. 1411, 1412 (E.D. Pa. 
1995). 
 84. Emery G. Lee, III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil 
Litigation, 60 DUKE L. J. 765 (2010). 
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class treatment is especially onerous to risk-averse defendants).85  Even 
if Acme is completely blameless, the sheer magnitude of the potential 
liability may cause it to a settle a class action—to avoid a company-
busting judgment—where Dr. Bayer (or rather his insurer) can litigate 
individual suits notwithstanding the possibility that he might lose one or 
two. 
c. Outcome-dependent Benefits 
Turning to the benefits of class treatment, there is intuitive reason to 
believe that class actions, by increasing the lawsuit rate categorically, do 
more to advance the underlying substantive law than individually-filed 
suits.  Indeed, according to some normative economic theories of the 
tort system, at least, a close to 100% lawsuit rate is optimal because that 
is the rate necessary to achieve optimal enforcement.86 
Normative economic theories notwithstanding, whether increasing 
enforcement of substantive law above the default, individual-filing rate 
for claims subject to class treatment is actually consistent with the 
purposes of the underlying substantive law is in fact a difficult question 
that depends in large part upon the law itself.  As stated, “[n]ot all 
substantive principles necessarily warrant enforcement to the nth 
degree.”87  Indeed, some have argued that Congress creates private 
rights of action under the assumption that lawsuits will be brought only 
occasionally—not whenever they are profitable—and that bringing such 
actions as class actions in fact frustrates the legislative bargain struck in 
the statute.88   
Statutes that provide for statutory damages, such as treble damages, 
are a good example of the fact that Congress does not always intend that 
people will sue whenever they believe they have suffered a legal wrong.  
Allowing these actions to proceed as class actions can not only frustrate 
the purposes of the underlying law,89 but can lead to absurd results90 and 
 
 85. Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-
Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872 (2006). 
 86. See generally Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973). 
 87. Richard Nagareda, Aggregation and its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide 
Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1885 (2006) (describing “‘the Javert problem’: the 
possibility that aggregation might amount to a rigid, literalistic insistence upon substantive law in all its 
details akin to that exhibited by the police inspector in Victor Hugo’s Les Miserables”). 
 88. Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection 
of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 77–80 (2003). 
 89. Richard Nagareda, Aggregation and its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide 
Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1878 (2006) (“Aggregation of statutory 
damages . . . would make for a kind of double counting discordant with the underlying remedial 
scheme.”). 
 90. Sheila B. Scheuerman, Due Process Forgotten: The Problem of Statutory Damages and 
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perhaps even violate due process.91  For instance, the Fair and Accurate 
Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) provides statutory damages where a 
business includes certain credit card information on its receipts.  In 
combination with the increase in the participation rate where a suit is 
subject to class treatment, the resulting damages can become ludicrous 
for businesses with many customers.  One such class action against the 
pizza restaurant Chuck E. Cheese sought damages of $1.9 billion; the 
company had only earned $68 million the year before.92  It is difficult to 
say that this result furthered the underlying values of the FACTA.93 
Furthermore, by increasing the magnitude of liability for claims 
subject to class treatment, the device increases the likelihood that such a 
claim will be brought at all.  As a result, for claims that would otherwise 
be “negative value”—not worth bringing, at least in monetary terms—
class treatment can affect not just the degree to which substantive law 
goals are furthered (be they compensation, retribution, or deterrence), 
but also whether these goals are realized at all.  This is another way in 
which class treatment may do more to further the outcome-dependent 
benefits of suing.   
d. Outcome-independent Benefits 
Finally, the primary outcome-independent benefit of letting suits into 
court—the court access value—is unaffected by class treatment, because 
the additional plaintiffs brought into court by the class action 
mechanism have not sought judicial vindication in the same sense as a 
plaintiff who actually wants to sue.  Absent a plaintiff demanding 
justice, the right to a “day in court” loses any meaning it has 
independent of advancing the compensation, deterrence, or retribution 
goals of substantive law.  Indeed, rhetoric articulating the access value 
presumes an active litigant,94 and at least one rationale for the access 
value is completely absent where a lawsuit comes to court as part of a 
class action.  Courts and commentators have explained that access is a 
value because the civil justice system provides an alternative to violence 
 
Class Actions, 74 MO. L. REV. 103 (2009) (“Combining the litigation incentives of statutory damages 
and the class action in one suit, however, creates the potential for absurd liability and over-deterrence.”). 
 91. See J. Cam Barker, Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal File-Sharing: 
The Troubling Effects of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages for Copyright Infringement, 83 TEX. 
L. REV. 525 (2004); cf. Catherine M. Sharkey, Revisiting the Noninsurable Costs of Accidents, 64 MD. 
L. REV. 409, 454 n.225 (2005). 
 92. Sheila B. Scheuerman, Due Process Forgotten: The Problem of Statutory Damages and 
Class Actions, 74 MISSOURI L. REV. 106 (2009). 
 93. Id. 
 94. E.g. Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 275 (2004) 
(“Participation is essential for the normative legitimacy of adjudication processes.”). 
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through which citizens can resolve disputes in a way that is legitimate 
even to the loser.  But, there is no need for courts to play that role when 
the plaintiff in a case did not choose to bring suit. 
B. The Pleading Threshold for Class Actions Should Be Different 
A brief recap of the preceding Part: class actions categorically 
increase both the outcome-independent and the outcome-dependent 
costs of letting suits into court; they have no categorical impact on the 
outcome-independent benefit of letting suits in; and, they may or may 
not categorically increase the outcome-dependent benefits of letting 
suits in, depending on what the crafters of the substantive law at issue in 
a particular case had in mind.  In short—a mixed bag. 
1. Policy Recommendation: A Different Pleading Threshold 
The foregoing analysis does not show that, as a matter of policy, 
pleading should serve a gate-keeping function at all, in class actions or 
otherwise.95  Furthermore, the foregoing analysis does not show that, if 
pleading should keep some cases out of court, the threshold for class 
actions should be more stringent than the threshold for individually-filed 
suits, and it does not show that the threshold for class actions should be 
less stringent.  But it does show that, because class actions categorically 
pose a different mix of pleading costs and benefits, the pleading 
threshold, if there is one, should be different for class actions.96 
 
 95. For an argument on this front, see, e.g., Colin T. Reardon, Pleading in the Information Age, 
56 N.Y.U. L. REV. (2010). 
 96. Professor Effron suggests that it may be appropriate to address any special burdens imposed 
by class actions at class certification, not the pleading stage, Effron, supra note 78, at 2041–44, but it is 
not apparent that such an approach is preferable.  Conceptually, gate keeping does not fit squarely into 
the class certification decision as it does into pleading: the class certification inquiry is designed to 
ensure that the interests of absentee plaintiffs will adequately be represented and that class treatment 
would be efficient, not to perform a gatekeeping merits determination.  Practically, class certification 
simply happens too late to forestall many of the costs that gatekeeping at the pleading stage is 
apparently intended to avoid, as Professor Effron recognizes.  Id. at 2042.  In most cases, by the time the 
class issue is joined extensive discovery will have taken place, a trend that should only increase since 
the Supreme Court married class certification and the merits in Wal Mart v. Dukes, and because 
certification is often tantamount to victory for the Plaintiffs, settlement will often already have occurred.  
E.g., Sheila B. Scheuerman, Due Process Forgotten: The Problem of Statutory Damages and Class 
Actions, 74 MO. L. REV. 106, 107 (2009); Allan Erbsen, From “Predominance” to “Resolvability”: A 
New Approach to Regulating Class Actions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 995, 1003 n.12 (2005).  Furthermore, it 
is entirely feasible to consider the fact of potential class treatment at the motion to dismiss stage, 
because class allegations not included in the initial complaint must be added by amendment later, and 
may not relate back to the initial complaint. See D.C. CT. R. 23.1 (2012) (requiring that allegations in 
support of class treatment be included in complaint); Leal v. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., No. M-09-228, 
2009 WL 4852670, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2009) (class allegations added via amended complaint can 
create new removal window under the Class Action Fairness Act); see also Wilson v. Zarhadnick, 534 
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Whether these differences warrant a more or less stringent pleading 
standard for class actions depends, ultimately, upon two policy 
judgments: (1) whether a higher lawsuit rate in fact does more to serve 
the purposes of the underlying substantive law; and, (2) whether and to 
what extent any such boost in the advancement of substantive law 
values associated with class treatment outweighs the corresponding 
increase in the burdens of class litigation.97  As explained in the next 
Part, the Federal Rules, the history of Twombly, and the Supreme 
Court’s other pleading case law reflect answers to these two questions 
that courts must take into account in applying Federal Rule 8.  As a 
result, courts interpreting Rule 8 (and therefore applying Twombly), 
should apply a relatively more stringent pleading threshold to class 
actions than they do to individually-filed actions. 
2. Rule 8 Recommendation: A More Stringent Pleading Rule 
As elaborated upon below, courts interpreting Federal Rule 8 should 
apply a more stringent “plausibility” requirement to damages class 
actions for three reasons.98  First, there is reason to believe that the fact 
that Twombly was a class action influenced the Supreme Court’s 
application of the standard in that case.  Second, the Supreme Court’s 
contemporaneous pleading decisions also reflect a more searching eye 
toward class actions at the pleading stage.  Third, the one possible 
benefit of class treatment (for pleading purposes) that could outweigh 
the increased burdens they put on the system—advancement of 
substantive law—is an improper consideration in interpreting the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 8.99 
 
F.2d 55, 57 (5th Cir. 1976) (“To maintain a class action, the existence of the class must be 
pleaded . . . .”). 
 97. Some might not subscribe to the access value and think lawsuits have no transaction benefit.  
Others might think that by inflating lawsuit rates over where they would be absent the mechanism, class 
actions always frustrate congressional intent. 
 98. Professor Effron discusses the possibility of singling out the class allegations of a complaint, 
treating a motion to dismiss such allegations separately from a motion to dismiss the named plaintiff's 
allegations in support of his or her own claim.  Effron, supra note 78, at 2051–56.  To the extent that a 
motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) may permissibly draw such a distinction between class 
claims and individual claims, the analysis here counsels subjecting the class allegations to a more 
stringent pleading threshold than the allegations of the named Plaintiff in support of his or her own 
claims. 
 99. Courts are not precluded from holding certain types of actions to a more demanding 
“plausibility” threshold by Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 
507 U.S. 163 (1993).  That case held that courts may not create pleading standards other than that 
provided in Rule 8 to govern certain substantive areas.  See id. at 168–69 (requiring specificity in 
pleading cases of a certain subject matter “is a result which must be obtained by the process of 
amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation”).  This Article does not advocate a 
different pleading standard for class actions, like the particularity requirement that governs certain 
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a. Twombly’s Procedural History Indicates the Supreme Court 
Considered its Class Status 
First, the procedural history of Twombly itself suggests that the fact 
that it was a class action influenced the Supreme Court’s application of 
the plausibility standard in that case.  Twombly was a massive would-be 
class action; the complaint alleged that various telephone carriers had 
categorically and almost imperceptibly overcharged their customers for 
several years, resulting in hundreds of millions in aggregate damages, 
and sought to bring suit on behalf of every injured customer.  The 
defendants moved to dismiss the complaint at the earliest possible 
stage—long before the court had adjudicated the question of class 
certification, any discovery had been conducted, or defendants had even 
answered the allegations of the complaint.  Pursuant to Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure 8 and 12(b)(6), the defendants argued the complaint was 
not even serious enough to require a response, let alone judicial 
resolution.100   
The plaintiffs in Twombly argued that at the pleading stage Federal 
Rule 8 requires only that the complaint say enough to give the defendant 
notice of the nature of the claim, which their complaint did.  For 
support, they pointed to a long line of cases from the Supreme Court and 
elsewhere.  For example, they quoted Conley v. Gibson for the 
proposition that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state 
a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set 
of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”101 
Defendants disagreed that notice was enough.  They argued to the 
Second Circuit that the necessary showing was in fact more stringent, 
and that some gate-keeping at the pleading stage was necessary in light 
of the likely burden of litigating the class action, as well as the sheer 
magnitude of liability that defendants could face in such a large class 
action.102  The Second Circuit rejected those arguments, holding that the 
 
actions under Federal Rule 9.  Rather, it advocates that the stringency of the governing “plausibility” 
standard be different for class actions.  Iqbal held that the “plausibility” standard applies in all civil 
actions, but it did not say that the standard applies with the same level of rigor.  But see W. Penn 
Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 98 (3rd Cir. 2010) (“Iqbal made clear that Rule 8’s 
pleading standard applies with the same level of rigor in ‘all civil actions.’”) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662 (2009) (emphasis omitted)).  This approach is not unprecedented; courts have consistently 
held that the pleading threshold for pro se actions should be less stringent than that applicable to other 
actions, see infra Part IV(A).  See also Hebbe v. Pliler, 611 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2010), amended 
and superseded on other grounds, 627 F.3d 338 (2010) (“[B]ecause Iqbal incorporated the Twombly 
pleading standard and Twombly did not alter courts’ treatment of pro se filings, we continue to construe 
pro se filings liberally.”).  Just as courts put a thumb on the scales in favor of pro se actions when 
applying Rule 8, courts can (and should) put a thumb on the scales against class actions in this context. 
 100. Brief for Petitioner at 13–14, Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 101. 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). 
 102. Id. 
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defendants actually sought recalibration of the pleading standard in light 
of the burdens they had identified and that such recalibration was 
beyond its competence: 
We are mindful that a balance is being struck here, that on one side of 
that balance is the sometimes colossal expense of undergoing discovery, 
that such costs themselves likely lead defendants to pay plaintiffs to settle 
what would ultimately be shown to be meritless claims, that the success 
of such meritless claims encourages others to be brought, and that the 
overall result may well be a burden on the courts and a deleterious effect 
on the manner in which and efficiency with which business is conducted.  
If that balance is to be re-calibrated, however, it is Congress or the 
Supreme Court that must do so.103 
Defendants accepted the Second Circuit’s invitation and took their 
case to the Supreme Court, where they again argued that Rule 8 should 
play a gate-keeping role by requiring a plaintiff do more than notify a 
defendant of the nature of her claim in order to access federal court.  
Plaintiffs, for their part, again argued to the contrary, and again pointed 
to a long line of precedent holding that notice alone is enough. 
This time the defendants were successful.  They argued to the 
Supreme Court that mere notice was not enough because “the costs and 
burdens imposed by meritless litigation—particularly class action 
litigation, where plaintiffs have no risk of counterclaims or harm to 
business and where discovery burdens are borne almost exclusively by 
defendants—are too well documented to require or to allow great 
elaboration here.”104  These burdens are especially pronounced in the 
class context, they argued, because “[i]f a plaintiff can secure 
certification of a class—even if the underlying case is without merit—
the pressure to settle (like the potential fee award to the class action 
lawyer) becomes enormous.”  Rigorous gate-keeping at the pleading 
stage, they explained, was necessary to curb speculative suits seeking 
only to extract a settlement.105 
The Supreme Court agreed.  The long line of precedent holding that 
notice is enough was incorrect, it held, and had always been.106  A 
liberal notice-pleading rule would allow prospective plaintiffs to bring 
lawsuits even though their case was at best speculative, the Court 
explained, just to bully defendants into a settlement.107  Rather, it 
 
 103. Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 111 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 104. Reply Brief for Petitioners, Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. 544 (2006), 2006 WL 
3265610, *13–14. 
 105. Id. at *14–15. 
 106. 550 U.S. at 562–63. 
 107. 550 U.S. at 559 (“[T]he threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to 
settle even anemic cases.”). 
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reminded courts that, “a district court must retain the power to insist 
upon some specificity in pleading before allowing a potentially massive 
factual controversy to proceed.”108  Applying the newly-announced 
“plausibility” standard to the case before it, the Court held that the 
plaintiffs had failed to state a claim.109  The Court’s heavy emphasis on 
the class action features of the Twombly complaint and the defendants’ 
explicit reliance upon Twombly’s status as a would-be class action in 
making their case to the Court provide reason to believe the Court 
considered this fact about the case in doing so. 
b. The Supreme Court’s Contemporaneous Decisions Indicate a More 
Stringent Threshold for Class Actions 
Second, interpreting Twombly’s plausibility standard to require more 
in the class action context in light of the greater burdens class actions 
pose explains what is otherwise a perplexing inconsistency in the 
Supreme Court’s recent pleading jurisprudence.  In five recent pleading 
decisions, the Supreme Court has appeared somewhat schizophrenic 
about the stringency of the showing required by Rule 8(a).  In 
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema110 and Erickson v. Pardus,111 the Court reversed 
the Second and Tenth Circuits, respectively, faulting them for applying a 
too-stringent pleading standard, even though the complaints at issue 
were relatively sparse.  But, in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,112 
Twombly, and Iqbal, it held that the complaints had not made the 
necessary showing, even though the allegations therein were somewhat 
detailed. 
The Ninth Circuit recently expressed confusion regarding the state of 
the law after these five cases: 
The juxtaposition of Swierkiewicz and Erickson, on the one hand, and 
Dura, Twombly, and Iqbal, on the other, is perplexing.  Even though the 
Court stated in all five cases that it was applying Rule 8(a), it is hard to 
avoid the conclusion that, in fact, the Court applied a higher pleading 
standard in Dura, Twombly, and Iqbal. . . . To the extent that we perceive 
a difference in the application of Rule 8(a) in the two groups of cases, it is 
difficult to know in cases that come before us whether we should apply 
the more lenient or the more demanding standard.113 
The Ninth Circuit is not alone in its confusion, commentators have 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. 534 U.S. 506 (2002). 
 111. 551 U.S. 89 (2007). 
 112. 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
 113. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1215 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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noticed this apparent disconnect, as well.114 
Swierkiewicz and Erickson were run-of-the-mill individually-filed 
lawsuits brought by an employee against his employer and a prisoner 
against his prison, respectively.  But Dura and Twombly were both large 
class actions.115  That the Supreme Court seemed to demand more of the 
complaints in the latter two cases should come as no surprise, then, 
because as explained above class actions should be subject to a different 
standard.  Following the teaching of the Supreme Court in Dura, 
Twombly, Swierkiewicz, and Erickson, that standard should be more 
stringent than the one applicable to ordinary lawsuits.  (As for Iqbal, the 
reason the complaint in that case failed to meet the plausibility threshold 
is beyond the scope of this paper, but others have explained at length 
why that case, although not a class action, was far from ordinary.116)  
Indeed, as discussed above, the petitioners in Twombly focused 
specifically on the burdens of class treatment in advocating for the 
pleading rule the Supreme Court adopted, and the Court appeared 
sympathetic to those arguments.117 
Put in concrete terms, Twombly stated that a complaint’s “[f]actual 
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 
level.”118  Whether a claim for relief is speculative or not can depend, 
quite naturally, on the breadth of the relief sought.  Factual allegations 
that suffice to render plausible the patient’s claim for individual relief in 
Patient v. Bayer might not suffice to raise a claim for class-wide relief in 
Patient v. Acme. 
c. Advancement of Substantive Law is an Inappropriate Consideration 
in Interpreting Rule 8 
Third, it is inappropriate for a court interpreting Rule 8, be it the 
 
 114. E.g. Bone, supra note 24, at 873. 
 115. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (noting the “potential expense is obvious enough . . . plaintiffs 
represent a putative class of at least 90 percent of all subscribers to local telephone or high speed 
Internet service in the continental United States, in an action against America’s largest 
telecommunications firms (with many thousands of employees generating reams and gigabytes of 
business records) for unspecified (if any) instances of antitrust violations that allegedly occurred over a 
period of seven years”). 
 116. See Suja A. Thomas, Oddball Iqbal and Twombly and Employment Discrimination, 2011 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 215 (2010). 
 117. See Reply Brief for Petitioners, Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. 544 (2006), 2006 
WL 3265610, *13–16. (“[T]he costs and burdens imposed by meritless litigation—particularly class 
action litigation, where plaintiffs have no risk of counterclaims or harm to business and where discovery 
burdens are borne almost exclusively by defendants—are too well documented to require or to allow 
great elaboration.”) (emphasis added); see also id. (“If a plaintiff can secure certification of a class—
even if the underlying case is without merit—the pressure to settle (like the potential fee award to the 
class action lawyer) becomes enormous.”). 
 118. 550 U.S. at 555. 
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Supreme Court or any other, to consider the only expected benefit of the 
class mechanism that potentially offsets its increased costs, i.e., class 
treatment’s potential to do more to advance substantive law.  Although 
Congress may certainly consider substantive law values in regulating the 
courts, the courts themselves may not.  Rather, the Rules Enabling Act, 
which is the basis for both Federal Rule 8 and Federal Rule 23, does not 
grant authority to “abridge, enlarge, or modify” substantive rights.  
Therefore, in interpreting and applying Federal Rule 8, the only policy 
considerations properly considered by courts are considerations that 
relate to procedure qua procedure.119 
This is made explicit by Federal Rule 1, which announces the factors 
to be considered in interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
That rule explains the Federal Rules “should be construed and 
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination 
of every action and proceeding.”  Unlike whether an interpretation will 
lead to the “just” and “inexpensive” determination of an action, whether 
a particular way of construing the rules will best advance the particular 
substantive law upon which a claim is premised is not a listed 
consideration.  Indeed, consideration of substantive law values in 
interpreting rules of procedure would run directly contrary to the 
principle of transubstantivity underlying the Federal Rules.120 
As explained above, the possibility that class actions do more to 
further substantive law values is the only potential benefit that counsels 
against applying a more stringent pleading standard to such actions.  As 
a result, because that consideration is itself improper in interpreting Rule 
8, the standard set forth in that rule, which Twombly interpreted to 
include a “plausibility requirement,” should be relatively more stringent 
when it is applied to class actions than when it is applied to individually-
filed suits. 
Furthermore, even if advancement of substantive law were a proper 
consideration in interpreting a federal rule, it is not the sort of clear, 
categorical benefit that should obviously be considered in applying the 
pleading rule.  That is because, as discussed above, whether class 
treatment in fact advances the substantive law at issue in a particular 
case is case-dependent and highly debatable.  Consideration of this 
potential effect would force every court applying the pleading rule to a 
new area of law to preside over the parties’ inevitable dispute about the 
 
 119. See Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, 
Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1885 (2006) (“[T]here is no authority in 
the hands of courts charged with the administration of aggregate procedure somehow to select which 
features of substantive law to temper.”). 
 120. Cf. David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal 
Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371 (2010). 
31
Lawrence: Courts Should Apply a Relatively More Stringent Pleading Threshol
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013
1256 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 81 
meaning and purpose of the substantive law at issue, in order to 
determine whether Congress would or would not have intended for suits 
to be brought en masse.  The expense of litigating this issue—in terms 
of both time and cost—would likely (though not inevitably) exceed the 
benefits. 
d. Calibrating the stringency of the pleading standard based on context 
is not unprecedented 
Application of a more stringent standard to certain cases based upon 
their procedural posture is not unprecedented.  The Supreme Court has 
explicitly shown a willingness to tailor the pleading standard in light of 
categorical differences among case types.  In Pardus the Court stated 
that pleadings brought pro se “must be held to less stringent 
standards.”121  So understood, while Iqbal makes clear that the 
“plausibility” requirement applies to all complaints, the stringency of 
this standard can simply be heightened in the context of class action 
complaints, just as it is lowered in the context of pro se complaints.  
Indeed, the framer of the civil rules, Charles E. Clark, believed that the 
showing required under Rule 8 itself can vary depending on context,122 
and the draftsman of Rule 23, Edward Cooper, proposed a heightened 
pleading rule for class actions.123 
Furthermore, that class action complaints should be subject to closer 
scrutiny is fully consistent with the “plausibility” standard, as articulated 
by the Supreme Court and understood by both commentators124 and 
courts.125  Indeed, numerous courts have suggested that the plausibility 
standard of Twombly should apply only, or most stringently, in certain 
 
 121. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). 
 122. See Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 27 IOWA L. REV. 272, 282 (1942) (noting that 
Rule 9, requiring allegations of fraud, inter alia, be plead with “particularity,” “probably states only 
what courts would do anyhow.”). 
 123. See Cooper, supra note 3, at 962. 
 124. Spencer, supra note 37, at 35 (“[L]anguage from Twombly could support the idea that 
pleading standards also vary depending upon a different kind of context than what we have been 
discussing thus far: the complexity and prospective cost associated with litigating the claim.  The 
Twombly Court certainly made the cost of discovery relevant to its analysis and lower courts that are so 
inclined may feel encouraged to do the same.”); Miller, supra note 31, at 36 (“Perhaps the most 
significant source of optimism is that the concepts articulated by the Court are malleable enough to 
enable federal judges to apply them in a manner consistent with systemic values other than cost and 
efficiency.”); Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed? The Economics of Pleading and 
Summary Judgment Standards, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 39 (2008) (suggesting antitrust lawsuits should 
be subject to a more stringent pleading standard, all else being equal). 
 125. Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Village of Lemont, Ill., 520 F.3d 797, 803–04 (7th Cir. 2008) (“If 
discovery is likely to be more than usually costly, the complaint must include as much factual detail and 
argument as may be required to show that the plaintiff has a plausible claim.”). 
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contexts where closer scrutiny is warranted.126 
Such an approach is entirely consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
guidance.  Although a number of cases and articles127 have attempted to 
define precisely the nature of the “plausibility” inquiry required by 
Twombly and Iqbal, Professor Noll has persuasively argued that the 
truth is that all we can say for sure is that, whatever goes into 
determining how “plausible” a claim is, and however “plausible” a 
claim must be in order to satisfy Federal Rule 8, the standard was not 
met by the complaints in Twombly or Iqbal.128  The Court itself said as 
much in Iqbal, explaining that “[d]etermining whether a complaint states 
a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a 
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 
judicial experience and common sense.”129  Therefore, for now the work 
of elaborating upon both the content of the standard (what a court 
considers in assessing “plausibility”) and its stringency (how “plausible” 
a case must be in order to pass the threshold) falls first into the capable 
hands of the district courts and courts of appeals.  For the reasons set 
forth above, courts should consider the fact that a case is brought as a 
class action as a thumb on the scales against plausibility. 
Finally, to the extent that decisions like Twombly and Iqbal have put 
the “important values of civil litigation . . . in jeopardy” by 
“subordinating” the day in court “to one-dimensional claims of 
excessive litigation costs and abuse,”130 applying a relatively higher 
pleading threshold to class actions represents a compromise position.  
Such an approach mitigates many of the litigation costs that drove 
Twombly and Iqbal, while preserving undiminished (or at the very least, 
less diminished) the individual litigant’s ability to secure his day in 
court.   
 
 126. Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Courts in and out of the Sixth 
Circuit have [indicated that Twombly’s] holding is likely limited to expensive, complicated litigation 
like that considered in Twombly.”); see also 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1216 (3d ed. 2012) (“[S]everal circuits have ruled that . . . the 
degree of ‘plausibility’ that must be present in any given complaint . . . will depend on the context.”). 
 127. E.g. Bone, supra note 24, at 849 (relying on “inferences from the way the Court applies the 
plausibility standard in [Twombly and Iqbal] and on contrasting language in the two opinions” to 
extrapolate a definition of the “plausibility” standard); Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even 
After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (2010). 
 128. See David L. Noll, The Indeterminacy of Iqbal, 99 GEO. L. REV. 117 (2010); see also Lonny 
S. Hoffman, Burn up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach 
Us About Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1257 (2008) (“Virtually everyone 
(except, perhaps, the five Justices in the majority in Twombly) regards plausibility as an ambiguous 
standard.”); Miller, supra note 31, at 28 (“Given the expanded judicial scope of inquiry on a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion, is it now incumbent on a plaintiff to negate any and all potentially innocent 
explanations for the defendant’s challenged conduct, a long-proscribed form of anticipatory pleading?”). 
 129. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 
 130. Miller, supra note 31. 
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IV. OTHER CANDIDATES FOR SPECIAL TREATMENT 
The mechanism by which a case comes to court is not the only fact 
that alters the mix of costs and benefits of allowing the case past the 
pleading stage.  This Part discusses two other case facts that the 
framework developed in Part II suggests should also be subject to a 
different pleading threshold.  First, courts have long recognized that 
suits brought pro se should be subject to a lower pleading threshold.  
Second, although not yet recognized by courts, cases challenging agency 
action on the administrative record—such as Administrative Procedure 
Act cases—should also be subject to a lower pleading threshold under 
Twombly, because these cases systematically pose lower discovery 
costs. 
A. Pro Se Actions Are Already Subject to a Less Stringent Threshold 
Federal courts have long applied a less-stringent pleading threshold to 
lawsuits that are brought pro se.  Indeed, the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
this rule in Erickson v. Pardus, a case decided since Twombly.131  There, 
the Court held that “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, 
must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted 
by lawyers.”132  Or as Federal Practice and Procedure puts it, “[t]he 
judicially created requirements for pleading under the rules are even less 
stringent (although there are limits) when a party is litigating pro se.”133   
The lower pleading threshold applied to pro se actions is fully 
consistent with the framework set forth in Part II, above.  A sustained 
analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, but pro se cases feature one 
categorical difference that could affect the mix of pleading benefits and 
burdens they pose, namely, the plaintiff in a pro se case has been unable 
(or perhaps unwilling) to secure counsel.  As a result, pro se lawsuits 
necessarily are brought solely by aggrieved persons who genuinely want 
to bring a suit that is either not profitable or otherwise popular (and so 
did not attract contingent-fee or pro bono legal representation).  Judges 
might reasonably believe that allowing such a case into court is more 
likely to serve the access value. 
 
 131. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully 
pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”). 
 132. Id. (emphasis added). 
 133. 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 1215 (3d ed. 2012); see also id. at n.11 (collecting cases). 
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B. Record Review Actions Should Be Subject to a Less Stringent 
Threshold 
Federal courts confronting Twombly-based motions to dismiss actions 
for review of agency action on the administrative record have applied 
the standard without comment.134  The framework set forth in Part II 
suggests, however, that the fact that a complaint (or count of a 
complaint) seeks review of agency action on the administrative record 
should cause courts to apply a relatively less stringent pleading 
requirement to that complaint (or count). 
Record review actions are systematically different in that discovery is 
not allowed in such a case (other than in certain rare and narrowly-
circumscribed circumstances).135  Instead, in a record review case, the 
agency compiles and files an administrative record that forms the 
exclusive basis for the Court’s review. 
An obvious implication of this difference for the costs and benefits of 
letting a record review case into court is that the concerns about broad 
and expensive discovery articulated in Twombly are all but nonexistent.  
Indeed, a number of districts specifically exempt record review cases 
from holding a pre-discovery conference under Federal Rule 16(f) 
requirements in light of this fact.136  In light of the categorically lower 
outcome-independent costs threatened by record review actions, the 
pleading threshold applicable to such actions should be relatively less 
stringent than that applicable to other actions. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There is no reason that a pleading rule designed to balance certain 
costs and benefits should be blind to the fact that different case types 
can pose a systematically different mix of costs and benefits.  Quite to 
the contrary, a pleading rule tailored to take this fact into account will 
maximize the benefits of pleading while minimizing its costs, and 
thereby best balance “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
 
 134. See Pat Huval Restaurant & Oyster Bar, Inc. v. U.S. Intern. Trade Comm’n, 823 F. Supp. 2d 
1365, 1379 (C.I.T. 2012) (“In the absence of any factual allegations from which we otherwise could 
conclude that either agency’s actions were violative of the APA, we conclude that the . . . Plaintiffs’ 
APA claim must be dismissed.”); Todd Constr., L.P. v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 235, 249 (Fed. Cl. 
2009). 
 135. See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985) (“The reviewing court is not 
generally empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being reviewed and to reach its own 
conclusions based on such an inquiry.”); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (“[T]he focal point for 
judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made 
initially in the reviewing court.”). 
 136. E.g. D.C. CT. R. 16.3(b) (2012) (exempting from meet and confer requirements “an action 
for review on an administrative record”). 
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every action.”137  As the foregoing analysis shows, the pleading 
threshold courts apply to class actions (and possibly pro se and record 
review actions), should be different than the threshold applicable to 
other types of actions.  Indeed, it should be higher. 
 
 137. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
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